1944
In the meantime an intelligence observation post at Longueval reported at 1100 hours that an enemy force of at least a company in strength, with a gun, was moving into Ste. Honorine. At this time the remainder of "W" Company was on the F.U.P. but was held there to await further orders, and a company of the 12th Parachute Battalion was covering the right flank of the F.U.P. Soon afterwards it was learnt that owing to heavy commitments elsewhere no artillery support would be forthcoming for the attack, and the attack was cancelled by the Brigade Commander, who was fortunately present at the time. As the company of the 12th Parachute Battalion was withdrawing it came under heavy mortar fire and suffered casualties, and at the same time parties of the enemy began infiltrating into the woods and orchard to the right front of the Battalion area. The 12th Parachute Battalion withdrew from Longueval and the Rifles were ordered to "stand to" and await the enemy attack. For the next two hours small parties of enemy (their poor fieldcraft and marksmanship did not warrant their being called snipers) made determined efforts to penetrate the Battalion'sposition but met with no success.
One party got to within fifty yards of Battalion H.Q. and threw grenades into "B" Company area. This party was small in number and was still further reduced by the accurate rifle fire of the R.S.M., who, with the I.O., was again in the attic of H.Q. The enemy could be heard shouting and cheering, presumably to encourage each other, and a few individuals attempted to cross the open field before Battalion H.Q.
They were subsequently buried in the same field.
Eventually a platoon of "D" Company, under the command of Lieutenant W. J. Chapman, M.C., swept the woods and orchards in front of the position and cleared them of enemy, but not before some enemy in front of "C" Company area had fired on wounded personnel lying on stretchers waiting evacuation from the R.A.P. The R.M.O. (Captain R. L. Rees) and O. C. Section 195 Field Ambulance (Captain F. Shaw), together with all R.A.M.C. personnel, displayed exceptional courage and devotion to duty when tending wounded under fire on this occasion.
After a break of approximately two hours, enemy forces again attempted to penetrate the position, this time supported by an S.P. gun. The Reece Platoon covering the front of the Battalion position suffered some casualties before withdrawing and the enemy again attacked but without success. The S.P. gun, which fired about twenty rounds towards Battalion H.Q., sent all its shells over the top of the house. Lieutenant R. Quinn opened fire with an anti-tank gun in reply and, although no hits were observed, the S.P. gun withdrew and the attack petered out.
June 10 and 11 were quiet days with occasional mortar duels and some long-range sniping, and it was not until 0130 hours on the 12th that the enemy made any further attempts to inflict casualties. At that hour a sudden burst of mortar fire caused several casualties around H.Q., and for the next two hours the position was subjected to continuous mortaring. It was discovered that an enemy patrol of about twelve to twenty strong, with at least three L.M.Gs. and a French 81 m.m. mortar, had established itself in an orchard in front of "C" Company and was firing at random into the Battalion area. The party withdrew before any steps could be taken to deal with it.
On June 13 a further attempt was made to capture Ste. Honorine, this time by the 5th Battalion Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders. The attack was preceded by a very heavy artillery bombardment and was successful, but an immediate counter-attack by Panzer Grenadiers, supported by S.P. guns, forced the Camerons to withdraw. The enemy followed up the withdrawal but not towards Longueval, and the R.U.R. position remained intact. Lieutenant Chapman's platoon, which was covering the right flank of the F.U.P. for the assault, came under heavy mortar fire when withdrawing and suffered casualties, including Lieutenant Chapman, who was badly wounded by a mortar bomb.
In the afternoon, "R" Group moved off to reconnoitre the area of Breville village, and it was considered that the enemy position was too Brigade. "D" Company moved to Breville the same evening to strengthen the force holding the village and preparations were made to leave Longueval on relief by the 5th Camerons early on June 14. At about 1000 hours that day the Rifles relieved the 12th Parachute Battalion at Breville. Breville had been captured from the enemy on the night 12/13 June after a very heavy artillery bombardment and was in a derelict condition with large numbers of British and German unburied dead lying around the area. Immediate steps were taken to secure the position against any possible enemy attack, following which burial of dead; salvage and cleaning-up were given priority.
Early during the afternoon of June 14 a deserter reached "D" Company lines and supplied the information that an enemy company was situated at Le Bas De Breville. The deserter, who was a Pole, also stated that enemy morale was poor and that others would desert if the opportunity presented itself. An, immediate patrol was sent out to ascertain whether the information regarding the enemy dispositions was correct and "A" Company was warned to be prepared to raid the enemy positions supported by a troop of Sherman tanks, which were under the command of the Battalion. At the last moment this raid was cancelled because the tanks were forbidden to leave the area of Breville village, and it was considered that the enemy position was too strong to warrant an attack by a company without tank support. The rest of the stay in Breville was spent in improving the defences and in continuous patrols to the enemy lines for information and identifications.
On June 16 two Polish deserters came in through "D" Company's lines. Shortly afterwards a sentry noticed ten Germans about forty yards in front of his position beckoning to him. He beckoned back and when they had approached to within twenty yards he opened fire. They flung themselves into the ditch, where they remained for a few minutes before throwing down their arms and signifying their wish to surrender by holding their hands over their heads. After reaching Battalion H.Q. area they stated that they had been sent out after the two Polish deserters and had thought that the sentry who had beckoned to them was one of these men. They were full-blooded Germans but were not dismayed at having been made prisoners. Lieutenant Quinn, however, was shot dead by an enemy sniper on June 16 whilst inspecting his platoon lay-out (anti-tank) and several other casualties were sustained during various patrols. One of these was Lieutenant M. L. Archdale, who failed to return from a patrol sent out to obtain enemy identifications. This occurred on June 26 during the early hours of the morning.
On the same day information was received that the Battalion would be relieved next morning by the 52nd Light Infantry. Sure enough, on the following day it moved to Amfreville, where it remained for one night before moving to an area at the rear of Breville. Here, although in Brigade reserve, it was covering a gap between the 52nd Light Infantry and 12th Devons. Although this area was still within the mortar range of the enemy it was possible to get some much needed rest during the period spent there. The peace was occasionally disturbed by enemy "overs," and there was a fairly regular shelling of a sector on the right-often seeming to be far nearer than it actually was. On the night of July 1 some confused firing to the immediate front gave rise to a fear that an enemy patrol had penetrated close, but this subsequently proved to be unfounded. It was unfortunate that heavy rain made the area extremely muddy during the Rifles' stay, flooding many slit trenches.
"B" Company spent this period under command of 9th Parachute Battalion in an area known as "The Brick Works," some distance to the south of the Battalion's position.
Orders were received for the Battalion to relieve the 12th Devons on July 4, but a last-minute alteration resulted in the Rifles relieving the 12th Parachute Battalion on the 5th at Le Mesnil, near the position held by "B" Company, who were then relieved by "C" Company. "C" Company Commander was shocked to discover how few men were left to hold this sector.
Here the Battalion remained until the 21st of the month. This period was probably the most uncomfortable time spent during the whole campaign, as enemy mortars had the position well registered and indulged in frequent practice. The area came to be known to the Battalion variously as " Bomb Alley," " Shell Fire Corner," and " Le Menace." Fortunately, the weather improved, July 5 being the first really fine day since the beginning of the operation. The first days were spent in digging in and improving the few positions taken over. Mortaring and shelling by the enemy began soon and became a regular feature of daily life. There was also aerial bombing of the area on the first night.
On July 6, troops were heartened by the receipt of twelve Russian deserters from the enemy. On the following night the first of two Tannoy broadcasts to the enemy took place in Russian and Polish. It was of course, difficult to judge their results, but it may at least be said that they were accorded a respectful audition and that the " counter broadcast " fire resulting was not so heavy as expected on the first occasion and nil on the second.
Little of major importance happened during the next two days except for regular shelling and mortaring by both sides. Casualties were suffered, but it was believed that counter fire was not without effect.
On the afternoon of the 10th, the 13th Parachute Battalion on the Rifles' right put in an attack on "Bob's Farm" to their front and the Rifles staged a diversion consisting of all the fire plan of an attack on " Triangle Wood," but without the actual attack. This resulted in an intense enemy barrage being put down on the Battalion area, lasting nearly five hours. Artillery, mortars, " sobbing sisters," multiple mortars and small arms fire were all employed. It was subsequently found that the attack was successful, but the Rifles' casualties were one man killed and ten wounded. Lieutenant Cranston was fatally wounded earlier in the day. The next day a party visited Ste. Honorine-at last in British hands-and located eleven graves of officers and men previously reported missing on D plus one day, including those of Lieutenant R. N. Morgan and Sergeant McCayna. Subsequent visits failed to locate any further ones.
On the evening of the 11 th there began a series of "stonks" on an enemy M.M.G. post known as " Stickies Corner," in which short but intense bursts of 2in. and 3in. mortar fire, Piats and occasional Vickers and artillery fire were used. It was felt that this harassing fire at various times during the day, interspersed with " quiet days " on which no shooting took place, must have gravely disconcerted the enemy.
Several normal routine days followed with the usual reciprocal mortaring and shelling. A routine night patrol was instituted to ensure that the enemy was not preparing to attack. This patrol suffered no casualties during the whole time it was in being. On the other hand it was regularly disappointed in its hope of " dating " the mysterious white lady so often reported (by other units) as being seen near the enemy lines at various places in the Divisional sector.
During this stage of the operation there was considerable sniping activity on both sides and the " Battle of the Ladders " was begun, "A" Company, during their occupation of the front line, had consolidated their snipers in Company H.Q. and to assist them had set up an observation post in a tree, necessitating the use of a ladder. From this post a similar erection was located on the enemy side of the line. After that, the matter somewhat resembled an old-fashioned duel with the seconds joining in, although it was considered most unfair of the enemy to use an Me. 109 to shoot up and destroy the original ladder. The close-of-play score on leaving Le Mesnil was 13-2 in the Rifles' favour (excluding possibles). Much credit for this success was due to the work of Corporal Ayres, of "A" Company, who was in charge of the Company's snipers, and who organized the rules of the game.
On the 16th the C.O. attended an investiture at Divisional H.Q. by General Montgomery; Rifleman Feeney and Rifleman Gilliland both receiving the Military Medal for bravery under fire during the attack on Ste. Honorine. That day was also memorable for the receipt of the first N.A.A.F.I. supplies of beer and spirits since June 6.
Two days later the Battalion had a ringside view of the first heavy aerial bombardment for close support. The waves upon waves of bombers appearing in the dawn, followed by the terrible roar of the heavy bombs and the sharper crash of the fragmentation bombs, were awe-inspiring in the extreme. The news that the big breakthrough had begun was tempered by the sudden death of Lieutenant G. A. Maginnis-killed by an unlucky mortar bomb as he walked out of his headquarters. News of the big battle was conflicting, and in spite of rumours of large casualties in tanks, and news-later contradicted-that the 2nd Battalion had suffered very severely at Troarn, there was a feeling that all the grim holding on the Battalion had done was at last justified and that without it the big push would not have been possible.
Enemy aircraft dropped a number of anti-personnel bombs around Battalion H.Q. on the night of the 19th, doing no harm but gravely alarming a number of people whose slit trenches were too close to be comfortable. A deluge of rain flooded the Battalion area on the afternoon of the 20th, rendering many slit trenches uninhabitable, and as the rain resumed on the following day it was with considerable relief that the area was handed over to the 12th Devons, during the 21st, before the Battalion moved back to the same Brigade reserve position it had left when going to Le Mesnil. This area was now found to be in an extremely dirty and muddy condition, but was soon made quite habitable. Fortunately, the rain stopped and the weather improved steadily.
On the afternoon of the 21st a timely draft of sixty reinforcements was received. During the period at Le Mesnil the Rifles suffered fifty-one casualties, two officers and three O.R.s killed, and two officers and forty-four O.R.s wounded. Here it remained until the 29th July, and although technically in a front line position was able to rest thoroughly, do a little P.T. and get much-needed hot baths at the R.E. Workshops near the River Orne. Unfortunately, the enemy developed a habit of strafing the area with Me. 109s at dusk or shortly after each evening, but without any effect except arousing intense indignation in all ranks. As the 2nd Battalion was within a mile at this stage, opportunity was taken of frequent visits, and the 1st Battalion was glad to find out that many people they had heard of as casualties were, in fact, alive and well.
AUGUST drifted slowly into September, on the first day of which the 1st Battalion returned to England to lick its wounds. In the interim it had relieved the 52nd Light Infantry on July 29th (1944) in the Chateau St. Come area, which, though quite close to the enemy, had an air of peace about it which greatly assisted morale - possibly on account of the good work done by the 52nd in rendering the slit trenches and general lay-out secure, clean and habitable.#\
On August 1st, " D " Company area (the right-hand sector) was ceded to the 12th Devons, and for the remainder of the stay in this area the C.O. was able to put one company at a time back into the reserve area for a complete rest. Enemy mortaring continued spasmodically, but the Battalion was now in a position to answer back in full measure, and it soon became obvious that the enemy was preferring discretion to valour in this respect.
Sniping activities were resumed, and the score rapidly proved that the team was well up to its Le Mesnil standards. After the first few days marked improvement in the enemy's fieldcraft was observed, although he persisted in bringing up supplies during every night in horse-drawn transport. As this was clearly audible and was regularly engaged by British artillery support, it can be presumed that it must have been a most hazardous journey.
On August 5th two prisoners were brought in. They had crawled right up to the defensive wire. One of them who had attempted to fire at his captors distinguished himself by dying as a result of this before he could be interrogated, and the other by refusing a glass of water and demanding alcohol from the Battalion Second-in-Command's remaining drops of whisky. Needless to say, he was disappointed, but he was not cured of his optimism, as for the next twenty-four hours he attempted to give an entirely false picture of his company layout. He was ultimately disillusioned on the subject of the Rifles' gullibility.
At this stage a system of co-ordinated mortar firing on a Brigade basis was introduced, known as the " stove-pipe " system, which, used against a series of pre-arranged targets, proved very effective as a counter-mortar activity, and was eventually used to stir up concern in the enemy on all occasions when his behaviour seemed suspicious.
Apart from fairly heavy and mutual shelling and mortaring, there was little to record during these days, and the Battalion settled down to a fairly regular routine. Lieutenant O'Hara Murray, who had been wounded at Ste. Honorine, returned with a reinforcement draft of sixty men, many of them being former members of the Battalion who had become casualties.
On the 11th there arrived the Recce party of the Princess Irene Netherlands Brigade Group, who were to relieve the Battalion the following day. The strength and equipment of this unit was a direct compliment to the Rifles. The rest area itself was near Colleville sur Orne, where the Battalion H.Q. was established (to the jealous envy of less fortunate parts of the Battalion) in the subterranean headquarters of a German flak network - a position remarkable for the thoroughness of its defence preparation, yet even more remarkable for the absence of any evidence of its having been defended.
The next few days were spent in rest, swimming and recreation, amidst glorious weather, with a general feeling of having a real holiday, after which everybody would be ready for anything.
On the morning of the 16th the Battalion was inspected by the Brigadier, and in the afternoon the Divisional Commander gave the officers and N.C.O.'s a most illuminating account of the Division's activities and strength from D. Day onwards. Few could fail to feel proud as he explained just how important the Divisional task -in fact, how vital to the whole campaign - had been the grim effort in holding out at Longueval. After the Divisional Commander had gone, the C.O. and his recce party re-visited Amfreville, where the Battalion was due to relieve the 12th Devons on the next day. But that night the C.O. was warned that the enemy on the Brigade front might withdraw at any time, and that on receipt of the word " Paddle," he would put into action the already prepared plans to pursue him closely. At 2230 hours he received the order " Prepare to Paddle." A hasty journey to Brigade procured the necessary maps and serial photographs and shortly after midnight orders were given out.
At 0310 hours on August 17th, 1944, the Battalion Duty Officer was informed by Brigade that there was no change in the enemy situation on the Brigade front and that transport would report later in the morning for the normal move back to Amfreville. At 0545 hours he was informed that operation " Paddle " was in progress. The Battalion was roused and started to move to Le Plein, being ferried on the limited transport available, the close pursuit force, consisting of "C" Company with, under command, Recce Platoon, Pioneer Platoon, and one section 249th Field Company, R.E., arriving at Le Plein by 0830 hours, followed by the remainder.
At 1300 hours the Battalion was ordered forward to Cabourg, and passed through the 12th Devons near Conneville and through the 52nd Light Infantry at Descanneville. Progress was slow, owing to the extensive cratering of the road surrounding country by Allied bombing. Demolition charges could be heard ahead, and at Le Petit Homme the Recce Platoon was within eight hundred yards of the enemy when the road was cratered in their path. At this time the C.O. was ordered to leave one company in the Petit Homme area to cut off any enemy retreating from Franceville Plage. " B " Company was ordered to occupy this area, which was done without opposition, although one officer (Lieutenant Bennett) and four other ranks became casualties through mines. This company also heard the Belgian Brigade Group operating on their left in the Merville Franceville Plage area.
Meanwhile the Battalion continued its advance on the coast road and towards Cabourg, encountering two further craters, which were by-passed with the aid of the R.E. The whole area was heavily mined and as speed was essential the line of advance was limited to the carriageway. Nevertheless, progress was reasonably rapid and no active opposition was encountered apart from a few shots exchanged between the Recce Platoon and the withdrawing enemy rearguard at Le Homme until the Recce Platoon was on the outskirts of Cabourg. At this point the enemy put up a definite resistance. This held up the advance despite attempts to outflank him. As the orders were to pursue the enemy closely without becoming too heavily engaged, and as the light was failing rapidly, it was decided to concentrate for the night in the area of Le Homme and Les Panoramas. The Troops dug in on the side of the road and small posts were put on the flanks.
A patrol was sent out early the following morning to test the possibilities of moving round the right flank of the enemy and at the same time the Battalion position was adjusted, areas being##123#[ 1944 1st Bn.]#124##cleared of mines to allow better dispersion. The Recce Platoon was again sent forward, engaging the enemy briskly and receiving several casualties. As the enemy position was very well camouflaged and strongly held they were unable to advance and were eventually ordered to withdraw slightly to a more favourable position. During the next two hours a party under Captain Martin succeeded in rescuing casualties under extremely difficult conditions. The patrol had returned reporting that an advance on the right would not be feasible because of enemy strongpoints, mines and floods.
Meanwhile, plans had been made to force an advance with the aid of tanks, but as the leading tank struck a mine while passing one of the craters and was put out of action, this plan had to be abandoned. This wrecked tank incidentally, blocked the only mine-free line of supply, and a system for ferrying had to be instituted, which worked with reasonable success. Orders had now been received to hold fast to the position and maintain contact with the enemy without entering any major engagement.
Shortly after midday the Battalion water cart blew up on a mine in the path cleared beside the wrecked tank, again blocking the supply route. (Mines were found to have been buried up to four feet deep by debris from the cratering of the road). During the afternoon Belgian engineers cleared away the tank and water cart and by dusk had a serviceable road working again. A patrol that night under Lieutenant O'Hara-Murray again encountered opposition and was fired on at close range, but returned safely. In spite of the intermittent fire on the position all day, only three other ranks became casualties. The remainder of the night was fairly quiet, and early next morning enemy shelling increased considerably in volume and accuracy, the whole day being most uncomfortable.
In the early afternoon the Battalion was put at four hours' notice to move to Le Plein and thence east to Troarn, and the C.O. and recce parties moved off to Brigade. On their return it was learnt that the Belgian Brigade Group would take over when the Rifles left for Le Plein and the thinning out of the Battalion at once began. That evening an unlucky shell knocked out one 6-pounder crew entirely, other casualties, however, being extremely light.
The relief was carried out under some difficulty because the Belgian Group arrived earlier than anticipated and had one Bren gun carrier blown up at the same crater as the tank and water cart by still further undiscovered Teller mines. Two of the medical orderlies distinguished themselves by rescuing Belgian soldiers whose clothes were blazing.
By midnight the Battalion had concentrated at Le Plein and early next morning moved by T.C.V. to Troarn. Heavy rain was failing and the move to the lying-up area near St. Richer was completed by march route. After the possession of the area had been settled with the Artillery who were in occupation, fires were lit and the troops were dried out. But immediately after dinner the C.O. was summoned to Brigade and ordered to move up to another lying-up area at Lieu St. Laurant. This move was completed by 2130 hours, only one detour being necessary.
The supply situation was now becoming most difficult and cooking arrangements were brigaded. At 0700 hours the following morning the Battalion was put at thirty minutes' notice to move and eventually moved at 1130 hours, being ordered, through the Devons and 52nd, to take up position on a spur near Vauville. While on the march a verbal message was received to go on and take Deauville and the hill behind it. This march was the beginning of the entry into territory still occupied by civilians, whose welcome was amazing. Constant reports were received from friendly civilians of recent enemy departures, French and Allied flags were appearing everywhere, and F.F.I. armlets became conspicuous.
When it had been reported that Deauville was cleared of enemy, the Battalion I.0. was sent forward to confirm, and was nearly mobbed by the tumultuous crowds who welcomed him as the first Allied soldier to enter the town. He also brought back word that all bridges over the Touques were blown and that the enemy were holding Trouville. As orders were received from Brigade to push on with all speed and secure the central bridge and a bridgehead beyond (the bridge alleged to be intact) the Recce Platoon was ordered forward to confirm the I.O.'s report on the bridge.
About this time " D " Company, the leading company, was being very accurately shelled on the road south of Deauville, and its transport was suffering. Accordingly, it was planned to send the transport over Mont Cassiny and the troops on foot. Just as this plan was about to be put into operation, a report from Brigade that Mont Cassiny was mined caused some delay but as reconnaissance proved a route clear and the S.P. shelling of the road increased, it was decided to let " D " Company (who were well ahead) continue round the foot of the hill, while the remainder of the troops went over it. During this move the Brigade I.0. came up with further instructions to capture the bridge intact, but was just in time to hear an R/T report from O.C. Recce Platoon that all bridges were blown and that the approaches were covered by enemy fire. A report had been received that the Belgians were in the town in strength but on arrival it was found that they were only in the eastern parts of the town.
Battalion H.Q. was established without difficulty in the former German Commander's residence, and " B " Company occupied its position at Vieux Deauville without difficulty. " C " Company proved to be fully under enemy view and a fresh area had to be found. " D " Company, the first arrivals, had some difficulty in reaching their forward area near the river, but occupied the area successfully, although their dawn patrols towards the river were heavily fired on. " A " Company, whose objective was Touques railway station, had some difficulty when taking over from the Belgian Company in that area, which was badly exposed, but only suffered one casualty. " C " Company, whose objective was on the left near the river, had the most difficult time, as an unlucky shell killed the Company Commander, Major E. F. Johnston, wounded a platoon commander, the C.S.M., two platoon sergeants, and several riflemen, including the two wireless operators, and put their set out of commission. As the Company Second-in-Command at that time was on a recce, there was some time before the company could be got together and reorganized. Sergeant Redpath, aided by the French, got the wounded away to safety. The company then managed to occupy the position. The Belgian Brigade Group was contacted, and now being in sufficient strength to take over its sector. " C "Company was withdrawn to the racecourse area.
That night Brigade sent up three French guides who (it was claimed) would guide the Battalion across the shallow part of the river to continue its advance. In point of fact, they stated that it was impossible to cross the river, but said that, given twenty-four hours for reconnaissance, they would guide small recce parties across. Eventually they agreed to lead one small party to a place where they could take a boat across, but flatly refused to cross themselves. Assault boats were procured, and eventually a small recce party got across in the early hours of the morning. Finding the enemy in possession and having no suitable way of bringing up the Battalion, they returned.
Meanwhile, Captain R. D. Martin, O.C. Recce Platoon, had again visited the bridges and reported that determined infantry with adequate support might get across one of the blown bridges. Full daylight and the absence of adequate support led to this plan being discarded. It was eventually decided to move upstream and force a crossing opposite Bonneville Sur Touques, using assault boats. The Battalion was accordingly withdrawn from Deauville with some difficulty, especially " A " Company, who suffered several casualties from shelling while pulling out. The Rifles were then dispersed round the area of La Poterie.
Excellent work was done by an R.E. officer, who, with his men, repaired an old footbridge sufficiently to make it passable for infantry. At 1630 hours a patrol consisting of 10 Platoon, led by Lieutenant O'Hara-Murray, crossed this bridge as a strong recce patrol with the church at Bonneville Sur Touques as its objective. If they were successful the Battalion was to follow. However, they came under heavy fire from the area of the railway and were forced to withdraw. As information then came to hand that the railway was the enemy's main line of defence and that between one thousand and two thousand men were holding east of the river, it became obvious that a Battalion crossing was out of the question, and the troops were withdrawn slightly to be out of mortar range, into the area between Glatigny and La Poterie.
Four patrols were sent across the river during the night in recce boats at different times and places, all achieving an average penetration of a thousand yards, and all contacting the enemy. One man was lost overboard and his body was recovered some days later. At 1000 hours the following morning (August 24th) information was received that the 52nd, who had moved up on the left, were across river m strength and that the Belgians were moving into Trouville. The Battalion was ordered to cross immediately and secure Bonneville Sur Touques and subsequently St. Philibert. Transport was to cross by a bridge further to the south.
By 1230 hours the entire Battalion had crossed the river and was occupying the Bonneville area. A small patrol visited Englesqueville to find it clear and collected four prisoners en route. Meanwhile other prisoners were surrendering all round. At 1500 hours the Battalion was ordered to continue towards St. Philibert and moved at once, establishing itself around St. Philibert by 1615 hours. F.F.I. here proved extremely useful in finding quarters and giving detailed information about enemy movements and their next line of defence. It is regretted that, although this information was passed back to Brigade, it did not, owing to Brigade being on the move, reach them in time to be of any value.
Next morning the Battalion was at two hours' notice to move, and at 1100 hours it followed the line already taken by the 52nd, until it was halted just behind them near Manneville le Raoult. This was the 52nd's objective and for which they were fighting hard. The Rifles were to pass through and secure Petit Beaucher after the 52nd had gained their objective. Little happened that day except for a narrow escape by the C.O. when a shell landed close to him in the open. That evening " D " Company were lent to the 52nd, as a counter-attack reserve, and took up position in the 52nd's area. The 52nd were ordered to send forward patrols and to indicate the moment the enemy had pulled out. By 0430 hours on the morning of the 16th there was still no news from the 52nd's patrols, so it was decided to push on immediately. The objective had now been given at Berville and all speed was made, transport being left behind. Signs of enemy retreat-very recent-were seen all along the road, but no contact was made. The Rifles were so close that civilians had to look several time before they were satisfied. Useful information was again received en route from French civilian sources, and only one short delay occurred where the road was cratered near Berville.
During this move three more prisoners were taken, also a horse, used by " C " Company Commander and known to all ranks as " Pegasus." At 0935 hours the Battalion entered Berville, twenty minutes ahead of the Belgians, being the first unit to reach the Seine. Operation " Paddle " was over.
Berville was found to be seething with indignation against its few collaborators, and at one stage a riot was narrowly averted when many of the villagers, who had been celebrating their liberation with calvados - a fiery and potent spirit - wanted to lynch the proprietress of a local cafe. A Rifleman sentry managed to divert most of the mob towards Battalion H.Q., where a promise to get the F.S.P. to deal with the case, pacified them. A few hours later the Battalion was ordered to an adjacent hamlet and the harassed I.0. was very thankful to hand over the civil problems of the district to the F.S.P. Serjeant who had just arrived. From the position on the hillside there was a magnificent ringside view of the R.A.F. bombing the escape route across the river.
Apart from a false alarm that the enemy were bringing artillery into position on the other side of the river there were no incidents to disturb the peace during the next two days. But while investigating this false alarm, the I.0. had the strange experience of watching, through field glasses, a German observer watching him through field glasses from the other side of the river . . . .
On the 28th the Brigade moved into reserve and the Battalion was allotted a wide area of frontage in which to settle and rest after the wild rush of " Paddle " and a short period of complete holiday began, with companies settled in widely separated farms and hamlets. While still in this area, notification was received of the award of the Military Cross to Major Hynds and Captain H. P. Wheldon for their gallantry on Hill 30 during the attack on Ste. Honorine.
Despite a succession of transport difficulties the Rifles arrived on the night of September 1st at a transit camp near Arromanches and the following afternoon was taken out in a landing craft to the transport. A heavy sea made the trans-shipment extremely hazardous, and eventually the landing craft had to be cut adrift with only half the troops taken off.
Next day the sea had gone down and the remainder of the Battalion was taken off without incident, and set sail immediately. Although the crossing was rough, very few were unable to appreciate the excellent food on board, and, despite heavy rain, the deck was crowded. Unfortunately it was too late to land that night, but next morning the Rifles were on their way to Bulford in T.C.V.'s.
Approximately five hundred and sixty-two men and thirty-two officers returned from France and the total casualties from the campaign were six officers and forty-five other ranks killed; one officer and thirty-three other ranks missing; and eighteen officers and three hundred and eighty-five other ranks wounded or evacuated through illness.
Ten officers and two hundred and eight other ranks, reinforcements, joined during the campaign (some of whom were previous casualties re-joined). The original strength of the Battalion on D. Day was forty-seven officers and eight hundred and seventeen other ranks.