1941-1942
Towards the end of October 1941, Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, the Commanding Officer, was informed that the Infantry battalions of the Brigade were to be converted to an airborne role. This news was duly made known to the Battalion, and its effect can only be described as electric. The general delight was only relieved by the pathetic and unsuccessful efforts of certain officers to have their postings to India cancelled. The fact that these postings were the result of voluntary application rendered the occasion hilarious for others whose wish to fight in the Far East was not so strong.
The immediate result of the Battalion's new role was scarcely noticeable, however. Airborne forces were not much more than an idea, although considerable progress had been made in training and equipping parachute battalions. Early in November the Commanding Officer and the Adjutant left for Manchester to undertake a glider flight from a neighbouring airfield. On arrival, all three Commanding Officers of the Brigade took off in a Hotspur glider. Intense alarm was experienced by the remainder of the party, anxiously awaiting their turn, when the glider proceeded to crash-land in an adjoining ploughed field. Investigation shewed that this almost disastrous mishap was due to a faulty tow-rope. No-one was seriously hurt, though in view of the importance of the human freight it is possible that the doctrine of tactical loading received its birth on this occasion. On December 7 the Battalion arrived in the Newbury area, the primary object being to concentrate what was now the 1st Airlanding Brigade near Netheravon airfield, which was then being used for all glider training. On conversion to the airborne role everyone was given an opportunity to transfer to another unit if desired. No records are now available to show how many took advantage of this offer, but they were very few indeed.
Early in 1942 an order was issued by the Headquarters of the 1st Airborne Division to the effect that, to ensure the highest possible standard, no other rank would be allowed to remain in the Division if his conduct were assessed at less than "Good." The wisdom or otherwise of this order is not under discussion, but the effect on the Battalion was very serious. Being a regular unit and having, even at this date, a high proportion of long-servicemen, it was naturally to be expected that on a check of conduct sheets -- under the terms of King's Regulations -- a number of Riflemen would be assessed as having characters below the standard required. Suffice it to say that about one hundred and forty men left the Battalion and were posted to other units of the Royal Ulster Rifles. The departure of these men can only be described as pathetic. At least one Rifleman, whose worth was undoubted, approached the Adjutant in actual tears at the railway station to ask whether even at that late hour a reprieve could not be granted.
The loss of this large number of trained soldiers, the majority of whom were good soldiers too, was happily offset to a certain extent by the arrival of a quite excellent draft of young soldiers from the 70th Battalion. This draft was probably the best ever received by the 1st during the war and reflected the greatest possible credit on the 70th.Training progressed steadily, if slowly. A certain amount of flying was possible and within a few months every one of the Battalion had experienced at least one glider flight. In those days flying was, however, a much more nerve-wracking business than it became later. The Hotspur glider was uncomfortable; the passengers were confined in a restricted space and could see little or nothing of the ground. Crashes, luckily never fatal for the Battalion, were frequent, and the arrival of a sub-unit at its destination was always problematical.
All this meant not only a great deal of re-equipment, but little or no collective training. However, the first jeeps arrived in April 1942, at about the same time that the maroon beret was introduced. A month later the Battalion moved to Bulford Fields Camp, the worst it had yet encountered. However, the proximity to Netheravon made training simpler and the availability of ranges made it easier to continue normal training. It was only now that real airborne training began for the 1st Battalion. Horsa gliders made air-landing exercises easy. Both officers and men swiftly became accustomed to their new role, which seemed particularly suited to the Irish.
1943-1944
Weeks slipped past into months as the Battalion continued with its training.All officers and men were looking forward to the day when they could put to the test against the Germans all the various lessons they had learnt since 1940. Then, as the day for the attack on Europe drew near, the pace quickened and training took place on a more realistic role. In the early part of 1943 Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. H. Carson took over command from Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell.During the period of waiting much of the surplus energy of the troops was naturally devoted to games and the Battalion figured prominently in all the major events. At football it lost only three matches during the whole season of 1943 and won the Divisional Cup by five goals to three after a replay. The boxing team suffered only one defeat in four years-when it was beaten by the 2nd Battalion the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry in the final of the Divisional Boxing Competition. In the divisional and individual cross country championships the R.U.R. team came home in second place out of sixteen. In the News of the World road relay race it was third in a record entry of thirty-one teams.
In January 1944, a proportion of the troops went down to Ilfracombe and either practised or learnt swimming. This was a pleasant change from routine training and in addition was bound to prove of real value in the not too distant future. During the early part of the year a number of officers and men had the pleasure of visiting and doing a short attachment to an American Division. In return a similar party visited the Battalion.
In the last few weeks at home many distinguished officers paid calls; some in their official capacity, but others to renew their acquaintance with their old regiment. On March 8, General Sir Bernard Montgomery, K.C.B., D.S.O., inspected the Battalion and received a great reception from the men, especially from those who had served under him either in Palestine or in the 3rd Division in France and Belgium.
Major-General R. H. Lorie, C.B., C.B.E., presented the Shamrock on St. Patrick's Day and wished the men "Good Luck" in their forthcoming battles. A few days later they were honoured by a visit from the Colonel of the Regiment. He talked to many of the men who had served with him in previous years. On Tuesday, May 16, known as "G Day," Major-General J. S. Steele, C.B., D.S.O., M.C.; Lieutenant-General J. F. Evetts, C.B., C.B.E., M.C.; and Major-General G. Brunskill, M.C., spent the day with the Battalion. Finally, on May 18, the Brigade was inspected by their Majesties the King and Queen, accompanied by Princess Elizabeth.
At the end of May the 1st Battalion was ordered to move to a transit camp. This it shared with the 9th Battalion the Parachute Regiment, which had occupied the next door Barracks in Bulford. Commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Otway, this unit had a strong sprinkling of the 1st Battalion, R.U.R., from Major Gordon Brown and Lieutenant Dowling downwards. The move, which was conducted in an air of great secrecy, took place on May 25 and 28, "A", "F" and "S" Companies going to Blakehill Farm and Battalion H.Q., with the remainder of the companies, to Broadwell. Reinforcements were left behind, at Bulford, under command of Major G. P. Rickcord, assisted by Lieutenant H. L. Croft. At the transit camps the Rifles found themselves entirely cut off from the outside world and settled down to enjoy the marvellous weather and to put a final edge to their preparations for the long-awaited D Day.Towards the end of their stay the story of what was to take place was gradually explained until, at the last, every single man knew everything it was possible for him to know about the operation. Rarely have officers had such great opportunity of putting all their men so adequately into the picture, and full use was made of the opportunity.
But an unfortunate accident with a "75" grenade on June 1st resulted in the death of Lieutenant Seale and Serjeant Dwyer, Major Warner and several others being wounded. As a result of this, Major Rickcord took over "B" Company at the last minute, and Lieutenant Hindson replaced Lieutenant Seale.
Shortly before "D" Day the good weather broke into a violent storm, after which there was a steady deterioration, and eventually "D" Day was postponed for twenty-four hours. On the evening of June 5th (D minus one day) the Battalion watched the Paratroops of the 9th Parachute Battalion take off -- a most impressive sight. Their men, in great spirits, were given a fine send-off by all ranks. The following day it was the Rifles' turn, and during the afternoon both parties moved off to their respective airfields. The take-off from both airfields went smoothly and there was no hitch, either with tug-aircraft or gliders, which might have necessitated the substitution of one of the reserve loads held in readiness.
D-Day
The flight across the Channel was uneventful, although at times inclined to be bumpy. Weather was fine and R.A.F. fighter cover much in evidence. By about 2045 hours the coast of France could be clearly seen and the River Orne and canal were soon recognized. Whilst crossing the coast it was evident that flak was being thrown up; but this appeared to be of a light character and there were only a few indications that it was inflicting casualties on the tugs, aircraft and gliders.
At 2100 hours, six minutes before the pre-arranged time, the first glider touched down. The majority of the landings were comparatively smooth, in spite of the flak and many wooden poles known as Rommel's Asparagus which were planted all over the landing Zone. Enemy mortar and small arms fire was being brought to bear on this, but it was not allowed to interfere in any way with the unloading and concentration of the Battalion, although the majority of glider loads experienced considerable difficulty in removing the tail unit, and unloading was therefore rather slower than would otherwise have been the case. It did not in fact appear to be the case that gliders had been fully modified in the same manner as those on which instruction had been carried out at Netheravon. However, by using saws, axes and other suitable implements, most of the tails were soon removed, gliders were unloaded and the Battalion concentrated south of Ranville in accordance with the pre-arranged plan at 2230 hours.
At this stage the Rifles had sustained only one casualty, considerably less than the numbers usually sustained on an ordinary air exercise -- a remarkable achievement which reflected great credit on the R.A.F. and Glider pilots. Even this casualty was caused after landing by mortar fire. On reaching the concentration area, the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. H. Carson went to Brigade Headquarters in order to obtain the latest information. The original plan envisaged the Battalion Second-in-Command (Major Drummond) landing with advance Div. H.Q. on the night of D minus one day and being well in the "picture" when the Battalion arrived. This was not to be, as the glider in which he originally took off made a forced landing at Worthing at 0300 hours. However, he just managed to get back to the airfield in time to enjoy the rather trivial excitement of taking off for the invasion twice within twenty-four hours.
Information received by the Commanding Officer at Brigade H.Q. showed that the main objective of the Battalion (Ste Honorine) was occupied by the enemy and that Ring Contour 30 to the north of Ste Honorine was also held. It was further reported that the enemy were at the same time in occupation of Longueval ("D" Company objective). The Battalion was therefore ordered to remain in the concentration area at Ranville until further orders were received. These came at 2345 hours, when it was decided to seize the area Ring Contour 30. "C" Company (Major F.R.A. Hynds) was ordered to seize this high ground and by 0200 hours the objective was occupied. The enemy who had been in this locality had withdrawn to the area of Ste. Honorine.
At 0200 hours on June 7th the Battalion received orders to proceed with the original intention of seizing and holding Ste. Honorine and Longueval. Placed in support were one field battery, and one fight battery, with an additional call on the cruiser H.M.S. "Arethusa" for fire support on Ste. Honorine. The plan for the capture of Longueval was briefly as follows:"C" Company with one platoon M.M.G. (Lieutenant H. R. Morgan) to remain on Hill 30 as fire company. The Battalion mortars (less "C" Company detachment which was in position on Hill 30) to take up a position south of Ranville and support the attack. The Second-in-Command was ordered to co-ordinate the fire support and contact the F.O.Os and F.O.B. on Hill 30. The remainder to carry out a right flanking attack on Longueval with "B" Company on right, "A" Company on left and "D" Company supporting "A" Company. Zero hour for the attack was 0900 hours.
The move to the F.U.P. was without incident, but life on Hill 30 was full of excitement. "C" Company, which had of necessity occupied hastily prepared positions in the dark, was in full view of the enemy from Ste. Honorine. The range was about twelve hundred yards, very suitable for mortars and S.P. guns which opened up a heavy and relentless fire and caused a number of casualties. The F.O.O. from the field regiment was later contacted some distance away but said that he could not reach Hill 30 owing to the intense fire. The F.O.B. with the call on H.M.S. "Arethusa" was present on Hill 30, but stated that: (a) His wireless could not get through to the control ship, and (b) That in any event he considered fire support from the cruiser was unlikely to be forthcoming as too many calls were already being made from other F.O.B.'s. The Battalion Mortar Officer was forward in observation on Hill 30, mortars ranged and prepared to fire on time.
Little need be said regarding the actual infantry attack on Longueval as the locality was not held by the enemy and was occupied without opposition.
The Commanding Officer now decided to attack Ste Honorine forthwith, leaving "C" Company as fire company on Hill 30, and "D" Company (Major A. J. Dyball) and the remainder of the Battalion in occupation of Longueval, the assault on Ste. Honorine to be carried out with "A" Company (Major C. E. Vickery) and "B" Company (Major Rickcord). Orders for the attack were issued to Hill 30 by wireless. Zero hour was given as 1100 hours. The fire plan consisted of mortar concentration on the forward edges of Ste. Honorine from Z-15 minutes to Z and an artillery concentration Z minus 3 minutes to Z plus two minutes.
The fire plan proceeded according to orders, but zero hour passed without any sign of the assaulting infantry advancing towards Ste. Honorine. Owing to unforeseen and unaccountable difficulties zero hour had to be postponed until 12.15 hours. It was not possible to postpone the original fire support plan owing to the difficulty of communications. Notification of the postponement did not reach Hill 30 until 1110 hours. The postponement seriously affected the repetition of the fire plan as the mortars and M.M.Gs. were running short of ammunition and there was little time for replenishment. Determined efforts were made, however, and a small supply was obtained. During all this time "C" Company was under continuous fire from Ferdinands (88 m.m. S.P. gun) and mortars. Casualties were heavy. Shortly before postponed zero hour seven enemy 75 m.m. S.P. guns (thought at the time to be tanks) were seen from Hill 30 moving from the north-east to Ste. Honorine. This information was sent by wireless to H.Q., but owing to an unfortunate breakdown in communications did not reach the Commanding Officer.
Under cover of smoke "A" and "B" Companies advanced from the F.U.P. across open ground towards Ste. Honorine. The enemy position was penetrated to some depth but heavy M.M.G. and artillery fire from S.P. guns inflicted considerable casualties and it was obvious to the Company Commanders concerned that a very gallant attempt to secure the position by the officers and men under their command, supported by very slender artillery and M.M.G. fire, could not succeed. They were out of touch with H.Q. and were forced to fall back on Longueval.
The Commanding Officer thereupon gave instructions for "C" Company to withdraw from Hill 30, which was still under very heavy enemy fire, and concentrate with the remainder of the Battalion in the defence of Longueval.
The following casualties were sustained during the attack on Ste. Honorine:
If the attack on Ste. Honorine was unsuccessful, it can at least be said that the spirit of the troops was completely unperturbed by encountering, on its first day, stronger enemy opposition than was anticipated. A price had been paid, but there was no doubt that considerable casualties had been inflicted on the enemy.
It was with a determined spirit of preparing for a fresh attack that the Rifles fell back on Longueval and turned the village in a very short time into a real fortress into which no penetration was to be tolerated. Civilians coming into Longueval reported that the Germans in Ste. Honorine and Colonbelles strongly resented the activities of the British troops based on Longueval. This indeed was a tonic to patrols and snipers.
By about 1500 hours on June 7 the bulk of the Battalion was concentrated in Longueval and the Commanding Officer decided to hold a tight defensive locality in the immediate area of the village itself. Digging and preparation of positions in houses and orchards behind then started immediately and before dusk a good reverse slope position had been secured. The few stragglers from "A", "B" and "C" Companies had by now rejoined their companies, and it was decided to bring up the rest of the Battalion transport from Ranville, together with a mortar platoon and part of an anti-tank platoon which had retired from Hill 30. The Intelligence Officer (Lieutenant R. W. MacD. Crockett) was sent to contact these elements and guide them to the new position. When this convoy was about to leave Ranville, enemy infantry, supported by tanks and S.P. guns, put in an attack on that place from the direction of Ste Honorine and the road to Longueval was cut. It was not until considerably later in the evening that this party was able to return, using the towpath along the bank of the River Orne. For the remainder of the stay in Longueval this was the only road which could be used and, although shells and mortar bombs frequently landed on it, particularly during the early stages, it remained open throughout.
During the night of June 7/8, Longueval was under continuous mortar and shell fire, which caused a number of casualties. In addition, small parties of the enemy frequently infiltrated into the woods and orchards above the position. The Rifles' mortars and the 3rd Division's artillery did much to discourage them from putting m an attack, and the speed with which F.O.Os. from the 3rd Division brought down artillery support was very noticeable.
On June 8 digging in continued, with occasional shelling and mortaring, particularly in the area of H.Q. During the afternoon an unfortunate misapprehension on the part of some gunners west of the River Orne resulted in a sharp artillery attack on the north-west corner of the Battalion area, resulting in five killed and nine wounded. Captain Rigby swam the river and canal in an endeavour to get in touch with the nearest unit and stop the firing, but narrowly escaped capture by an enemy D.R. For the remainder of the stay in Longueval he was equipped with clothing from a house which had been the H.Q. of a branch of the Todt Organization.
Later in the evening a body of enemy, estimated at one platoon, was seen in the area in front of Battalion H.Q. apparently preparing for an attack. These were engaged with small arms fire by Regimental Serjeant Major G. Griffiths and the Adjutant (Captain R. E. H. Sheridan) from the attic and by Battalion H.Q. clerks, Defence, and Intelligence Sections. The enemy moved off to the left flank, where fire from "B" Company forced them to withdraw without having inflicted any casualties. For the rest of the day and the rest of the night the Battalion patrols covered the area in front of the position and kept watch on Ste. Honorine, but the enemy made no further attacks.
About this time considerable difficulty was experienced in maintaining R/T communication with Brigade. The enemy had got onto the Battalion's frequency and carried out a continuous jamming programme with endless and meaningless Morse transmissions. At times too a voice speaking in English kept asking for code-signs and would give Slidex authentication when challenged. The station sending out these transmissions was either very powerful or very close, and succeeded in causing considerable difficulties and for some time a complete break in communication with Brigade H.Q.
Early on the 9th June patrols reported the forward areas clear of enemy, and the Recce Platoon reported that the artillery fire on Ste. Honorine during the night had been very successful and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Prolonged inspection of the village from a respectful distance failed to reveal any indication of enemy occupation and it was decided to occupy it as soon as possible with the 12th Parachute Battalion taking over Longueval.
"D" Company was split into two strong patrols of two platoons each. One, under Major Dyball, was to proceed up the river to Colonbelles (reported clear of enemy by civilian sources) and thence to Ste. Honorine, and the other-under Captain K. H. Donelly-was to start an hour later and move direct to Ste. Honorine. Major Dyball's party, accompanied by the Intelligence Officer, and with Lieutenant A. A. Milliken as Interpreter, left Longueval at 1000 hours and moved up the tow-path to a point on the outskirts of Colonbelles, where it turned up through a wood and debouched on the main road opposite some cottages on the fringe of the town. Contact with French civilians was made and it was discovered that a party of about twenty enemy had gone up the road towards Longueval. It was also learned that a force about two hundred strong had left earlier by the Ste. Honorine road and approximately the same number were in Colonbelles itself; with some armoured cars. Almost immediately it was discovered that the party of twenty were returning along the road, and Major Dyball decided to ambush this party.
The enemy came down the road unsuspectingly and, when a grenade thrown by Major Dyball exploded in their midst, were mown down by concentrated fire from Brens, Stens and rifles at short range. In a few seconds the entire party was lying in the road, but the rear party of the enemy patrol opened intense fire with an M.G. 34 and there were indications that an armoured car was approaching from Colonbelles. As the enemy was known to be in some strength, it was decided to withdraw.
This operation was carried out successfully but some casualties were suffered by the platoon crossing the road to rejoin the main body and it had to lie up for some time. Subsequent patrol again contacted the civilians and learnt that eleven enemy dead and a number of wounded were left on the road as the patrol withdrew. The Rifles' casualties were two killed and one wounded. It was also learnt from civilian sources that the enemy in Colonbelles were perturbed and annoyed as a result of this operation and threatened severe reprisals on the civilians whom they suspected of having given information. The latter were, however, able to clear themselves.